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I. JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2).
II. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the Salt Lake City Planning Commission acted within its lawfully
delegated powers in granting a conditional use permit to the Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall
& McCarthy 401(K) Profit Sharing Plan ("Van Cott") to build a planned development on
the subject property owned by Van Cott.
Failure to Preserve for Appeal: Appellants Donner Crest Condominium
Homeowners' Association and Oakcrest Condominium Homeowners' Association
("Donner Crest") present several arguments for the first time in their brief to this Court.
Donner Crest's failure to present these arguments prior to this appeal precludes this Court
from hearing them. As detailed more fully below, Donner Crest failed to preserve the
issues of whether the Van Cott property is a valid candidate for a PUD, and whether the
City's PUD provisions are illegal as applied to this case.
Standard of Appellate Review: If a zoning plan "could promote the general
welfare; or even if it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general
welfare, that act should be upheld." Marshall v. Salt Lake City. 141 P.2d 704,709 (Utah
1943). "A municipality's land use decisions are entitled to a great deal of deference."
Springville Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. City of Springyille. 1999 UT 25, If 23, 979 P.2d
332, 336 (citations omitted). Courts are required to "(a) presume that land use decisions
and regulations are valid; and (b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary,
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capricious, or illegal." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3). "Although section 10-9-1001
expressly applies only to the district court, the standard f o r . . . review [by the Court of
Appeals]... is the same standard established in the Utah Code for the district court's
review." Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City. 997 P.2d 321, 323 n.3 (Utah App. 2000)
(internal quotations omitted; citations omitted). This Court examines legal conclusions,
including statutory interpretation, for correctness. See, e.g.. Young v. Salt Lake City
School Dist.. 2002 UT 64, K 10, 52 P.3d 1230, 1233 (Utah 2002).
III. IMPORTANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
In addition to the statutes provided by Donner Crest in its brief, Van Cott includes
the following provisions in Addendum-1 ("Add.-l"):
1.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-102. Add.-l at 1.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-204. Add.-l at 1.

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. Add.-l at 1.

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The true dispute in this case centers around whether Salt Lake City's

comprehensive zoning ordinance (the "Zoning Ordinance") was legally applied in this
case to grant Van Cott a conditional use permit for its planned development. While
presenting an informative overview on land use law, Donner Crest fails to present any
legal argument tending to show that the Planning Commission acted outside the scope of
its authority, or that the City Council lacked the authority to delegate such power to the
Planning Commission. Further, Donner Crest's arguments that the Van Cott parcel does
not qualify for planned development, and that the City's planned development scheme as
2

applied is illegal, are presented for the first time in this case on appeal. As such, this
Court should not entertain the arguments, but should affirm the decision of the district
court.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Van Cott generally agrees with the statement of Donner Crest regarding the

proceedings up to this point, as detailed more fully in Donner Crest's brief. Br. of
Appellant p. 3-4.
C.

REPLY TO DONNER CREST'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Van Cott assumed only for the limited purposes of the court's ruling on its Motion

for Summary Judgment that the facts alleged in Donner Crest's Amended Complaint
were true. R. 168.
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In this appeal, Donner Crest argues that the decision of the trial court, which
affirmed the decisions reached by the Salt Lake City Planning Commission and the Salt
Lake City Land Use Appeals Board, should be second-guessed. Donner Crest advances a
variety of broad reasons for this untenable position. Donner Crest's arguments should be
rejected.
First, Donner Crest failed to raise all these issues below. Donner Crest's
arguments that the Van Cott property does not qualify as a planned development and that
the City's planned development provision is illegal are raised here for the first time.
These issues should be dismissed out-of-hand by this Court as not properly preserved and
raised.
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Second, the actions of the Planning Commission in approving the Van Cott
planned development application was proper in all respects and was done pursuant to
statutorily granted powers. The Planning Commission properly granted a conditional use
pursuant to the purposes and specific provisions of the governing state Act and municipal
Code. The Planning Commission made detailed findings to which this Court must defer
with respect to the property in question. Those findings comply with every relevant
provision of law. The conditional use provisions allow the Planning Commission to
"change, alter, modify or waive" any provision of the zoning ordinance or the City's
subdivision regulations to achieve the purposes for which a planned development may be
approved. The Van Cott property plainly falls within the definition of a planned
development under the Salt Lake City ordinance. This is not, as Donner Crest argues,
"illegal spot zoning" as it does not constitute a use classification materially different and
inconsistent with the surrounding area.
Finally, Van Cott was not required to obtain a separate variance from the Board of
Adjustment. The Planning Commission modified the frontage requirement pursuant to its
lawfully delegated authority in approving a planned development under the zoning
ordinance. A variance is required if a party seeks to develop property outside the
strictures of the zoning ordinance. Because the Van Cott planned development was
authorized by the comprehensive zoning ordinance, a variance was not required. Donner
Crest provides no governing authority to the contrary to support this indefensible
position.
For each of these reasons, the decision below should be affirmed.

4

VI. ARGUMENT
The Planning Commission's actions in approving the Van Cott planned
development is proper in all respects. The Van Cott property is a proper candidate for a
PUD and the Planning Commission acted within its statutorily granted powers in
approving Van Cott's application for a conditional use permit.
A.

DONNER CREST FAILED TO SUFFICIENTLY PRESERVE FOR
APPEAL ARGUMENTS WHICH IT NOW ATTEMPTS TO ADVANCE.
Donner Crest failed to raise issues before the trial court which it now attempts to

advance in this Court. It is for the first time on appeal that Donner Crest asserts at least
two arguments: (1) the Van Cott property and project do not qualify as a planned
development and (2) as applied to the facts of this case, the City's PUD provision is
illegal. See Br. of Appellant p. 30-37. Such an attempt is not allowed under either the
Rules of Appellate procedure or Utah case law.
Courts in Utah have long held that a party "who fails to bring an issue before the
trial court is generally barred from raising it for the first time on appeal." State v. Irwin.
924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah App. 1996). Furthermore, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
require that Donner Crest provide in its brief "citation to the record showing that the issue
was preserved in the trial court; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue
not preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. Proc. 24(a)(5)(A) and (B). "[E]ach issue
presented for review in an appellant's brief must cite to the record, showing that the issue
was preserved in the trial court or, if it was not preserved, then appellant must set forth
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the grounds permitting appellate review. State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d at 7 n. 2 (citing Utah
Rule App. Proc. 24(a)). This Court has long held that:
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely bring
the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court
an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. "Issues not raised in the
trial court in timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding [the
appellate court] from considering their merits on appeal."
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm., 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah App. 1997) (bracket in
original) (citing Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill. 849 P.2d 602, 604 n.l (Utah App. 1993)).
Utah courts have set forth three specific factors for determining whether an issue
was preserved for appeal: "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue
must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority." Brookside Mobile Home Park. Ltd. v. Peebles. 2002 UT 48,
114,48 P.3d 96S, 912 (citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah
1998)). The mere assertion of an issue is not sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.
As previously explained by this Court, "[f|or an issue to be sufficiently raised, even if
indirectly, it must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge
can consider it." LeBaron & Associates, Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises. Inc.. 823 P.2d 479,
483 (Utah App. 1991).
In its opening brief, Dormer Crest has asserted for the first time that the Planning
Commission's grant of a planned unit development to Van Cott was illegal in that the
Van Cott property is not a proper candidate for a PUD and that the PUD statute, at least
as applied to the facts of this case, is illegal. Although, Dormer Crest contends that the
issue of the "legality of the Planning Commission's grant of a planned development
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conditional use permit was extensively argued in the summary judgment briefing below,"
the issue of the Van Cott property being a proper candidate and the legality of the entire
PUD concept was never asserted in the trial court. Br. of Appellants p.l. As a review of
the Record reveals, however, Donner Crest's sole argument in this regard until this
appeal has been that only the Board of Adjustment has the authority to grant a variance
from the requirements of the zoning ordinance, which Donner Crest claims this was. See
R. 324-35.
A closer reading of Donner Crest's Memorandum opposing summary judgment
shows that, while it made many arguments, none of the arguments made below contended
that the Van Cott parcel was not fit for planned development, nor did they address the
legality of the City's planned development scheme. Before the trial court, Donner Crest
argued that:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

the Utah Code requires equal treatment of property owners within a zoning
district, R. 326-27;
a variance is required to deviate from the standards of the Zoning
Ordinance, R. 327-29;
only the Board of Adjustment is allowed to grant a variance from the
requirements of the Zoning Ordinance, R. 329-30;
variances may only be granted when specific findings are made, R. 330-32;
and
the City's attempt to empower the Planning Commission to grant variances
from the Zoning Ordinance is illegal, R. 332-35.

Donner Crest did not argue before the trial court that the Planning Commission's
grant of a conditional use permit was illegal. Rather, it focused its efforts on labeling the
Van Cott planned development conditional use permit a variance. A court should not
pass on issues argued for the first time on appeal. Donner Crest's principal arguments on
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appeal, including that the Van Cott project is not a PUD candidate, and that the City's
PUD provision is illegal, were never even presented to the trial court. This Court should
not allow Dormer Crest to avoid the requirements of the Rules of Appellate Procedure
and years of case law by proposing new arguments for the first time on appeal. Neither
of these arguments were raised in a timely manner to the district court. As such, this
Court should not entertain Dormer Crest's new arguments for the first time, but should
affirm the decision of the district court.
B.

THE STATE ACT GRANTS MUNICIPALITIES BROAD POWER TO
ZONE AND TO REGULATE LAND USES.
The actions of the Planning Commission in approving the Van Cott planned

development application was proper in all respects and was done pursuant to statutorily
granted powers. In spite of Donner Crest's continued insistence that Van Cott obtained
an illegal variance from the requirements of the zoning ordinance, the Planning
Commission granted no variance. Rather, what it did grant to Van Cott was a conditional
use permit for a planned development, in accordance with the procedures mandated by
the Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act (the "State Act" or "Act"),
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-101, et seq., and the Salt Lake City ordinances.
The Act grants a municipality broad authority to enact a comprehensive zoning
scheme and to regulate land uses. Section 10-9-102 provides the purpose statement of
the Act:
To accomplish the purpose of this chapter, and in order to provide
for the health, safety, and welfare, and promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, convenience,
and aesthetics of the municipality and its present and future
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inhabitants and businesses, to protect the tax base, secure economy
in governmental expenditures, foster the state's agricultural and other
industries, protect both urban and nonurban development, and to
protect property values, municipalities may enact all ordinances,
resolutions, and rules that they consider necessary for the use and
development of land within the municipality, including ordinances,
resolutions, and rules governing uses, density, open spaces,
structures, buildings, energy efficiency, light and air, air quality,
transportation and public or alternative transportation, infrastructure,
public facilities, vegetation, and trees and landscaping, unless those
ordinances, resolutions, or rules are expressly prohibited by law.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-102 (emphasis added). The Legislature allowed for any and all
enactments considered necessary by a municipality, as long as they are not expressly
prohibited by the Act. This broad power granted to the City Council further evidences
the Legislature's intent that municipalities be empowered to make land use decisions
which the municipality considers necessary.
The Act further permits a municipality to "enact a zoning ordinance establishing
regulations for land use and development that furthers the intent o f the Act. Utah Code
Ann. § 10-9-401. In furtherance of a municipality's zoning ordinance, its "legislative
body may amend: (i) the number, shape, boundaries, or area of any zoning district; (ii)
any regulation of or within the zoning district; or (iii) any other provision of the zoning
ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-403 (l)(a) (emphasis added). Finally, "[a] zoning
ordinance may contain provisions for conditional uses that may be allowed, allowed with
conditions, or denied in designated zoning districts, based on compliance with standards
and criteria set forth in the zoning ordinance for those uses." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9407(1). Thus, the Act foresees that a municipality will from time to time need to amend
regulations within zoning districts, as well as the zoning ordinance itself.
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In accordance with these grants of authority, the City Council did provide for
conditional uses in its comprehensive zoning plan. "A conditional use is a use which has
potential adverse impacts upon the immediate neighborhood and the City as a whole."
S.L.C. Code § 21 A.54.010. Further, the City Council provided for planned developments
as a conditional use. "A planned development is a distinct category of conditional use.
As such, it is intended to encourage the efficient use of land and resources, promoting
greater efficiency and public and utility services and encouraging innovation in the
planning and building of all types of development." S.L.C. Code § 21A.54.150(A).
In furtherance of the broad authority provided under the Act, and specific grants of
authority, the Salt Lake City Council also provided for a planning commission. "Each
municipality may enact an ordinance establishing a planning commission." Utah Code
Ann. § 10-9-201. The Salt Lake City Planning Commission was established pursuant to
this grant. See S.L.C. Code § 2.20.010, et seq.; see also S.L.C. Code § 21A.06.030.
"The planning commission s h a l l . . . administer provisions of the zoning ordinance,
where specifically provided for in the zoning ordinance adopted by the legislative body . .
. [and] exercise any other powers: (a) that are necessary to enable it to perform its
function; or (b) delegated to it by the legislative body" Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-204(3),
(8) (emphasis added). The Act clearly enables a municipality to establish a planning
commission, and to delegate to that Commission very broad power and authority, as the
City Council determines and delegates.
As part of the creation of the Planning Commission, the City Council empowered
the Planning Commission and gave it jurisdiction and authority to "review, hear and
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decide applications for conditional uses, including planned developments, pursuant to the
procedures and standards set forth in Part V, Chapter 21A.54, Conditional Uses." S.L.C.
Code § 21A.06.030(B)(5). In addition, the City Council specifically granted the authority
to the Planning Commission to modify regulations with respect to planned developments.
"In approving any planned development, the planning commission may change, alter,
modify or waive any provision of this title or of the City's subdivision regulations as they
apply to the proposed planned development." S.L.C. Code § 21A.54.150(C) (emphasis
added.)
Pursuant to this statutory scheme, the Planning Commission considered and
approved the Van Cott application for a planned development covering the subject
property. Pursuant to the Zoning Ordinance, Van Cott submitted its application for a
planned development on its property. (R. 16.) The Planning Commission's staff then
reviewed the Van Cott application and made its recommendation to the Planning
Commission for approval. (R. 205-16.) As required by S.L.C. Code § 21A.54.150, the
Planning Commission made the specific requisite findings in approving the Van Cott
application for a planned development. (R. 288-90.) The Planning Commission made
the following findings:
Findings - Standards for Conditional Use
1.
2.

A Planned Development is allowed as a Conditional Use in this
zone.
The proposed development is in harmony with the general purposes
and intent of the Standards for Conditional Use and is compatible
with and implements the planning goals and objectives of the City,
including applicable City master plans. It is not impossible from a
geological standpoint or of a geologic concern to build on this slope
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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

and, in fact, it is found that the development, if built as engineered
by Bill Gordon, will increase the geologic stability of a portion of
the area.
Streets or other means of access to the proposed development are
suitable and adequate to carry anticipated traffic and will not
materially degrade the service level on the adjacent streets.
The internal circulation system of the proposed development is
properly designed. The visitor parking stalls shall be increased to
three for this six-unit development.
Existing and proposed utilities are or will be adequate for the
proposed development and will not have an adverse impact to
adjacent land uses or resources.
Appropriate buffering is provided to protect adjacent land uses from
light, noise, and visual impacts, and responsibility will be delegated
to the Planning Director to assure that the necessary buffering
occurs.
Architecture and building materials are consistent with the
development and compatible with the adjacent neighborhood, and
responsibility will be delegated to the Planning Director to work
with the architect to assure that materials are compatible.
Landscaping is appropriate for the scale of the development, and
responsibility will be delegated to the Planning Director to assure
that it is appropriate.
The proposed development is compatible with the surrounding
neighborhood and will not have a material net cumulative adverse
impact on the neighborhood or the City as a whole.
The proposed development complies with all other applicable codes
and ordinances.

Findings - Planned Development
The Planning Commission finds that the following standards of the Planned
Development section of the Zoning Ordinance will be met:
1.
2.

3.

Creation of a more desirable environment than would be possible
through strict application of the other City land use regulations.
Promotion of a creative approach to the use of land and related
physical facilities resulting in better design and development,
including aesthetic amenities.
Combination and coordination of architectural styles, building
forms, and building relationships.

12

4.

5.
6.

Preservation and enhancement of desirable site characteristics such
as natural topography, vegetation and geologic features, and the
prevention of soil erosion.
Use of design, landscape or architectural features to create a pleasing
environment.
Inclusion of special development amenities.

(R. 288-90.)
As part of the approval process for Van Cott's planned development application,
the Planning Commission addressed the need to change, alter, modify or waive the street
frontage requirement imposed within this zoning district. The Planning Commission
made the specific findings required of S.L.C. Code § 21A.54.150(C): "No such change,
alteration, modification or waiver shall be approved unless the Planning Commission
shall find that the proposed planned development: 1. Will achieve the purposes for which
a planned development may be approved pursuant to subsection A of this section; and 2.
Will not violate the general purposes, goals and objectives of this title and of any plans
adopted by the planning commission or the city council." Id. As set forth above, the
findings regarding Subsection A were discussed in the Planning Commission Staff
Report and adopted by the Planning Commission. (R. 215-16,288-90.) With respect to
the second necessary finding that approval will not violate the general purposes, goals
and objectives of this Title and of any plans adopted by the Planning Commission or the
City Council, the Planning Commission plainly made these findings as well: "The
proposed development is in harmony with the general purposes and intent of the
Standards for Conditional Uses and is compatible with and implements the planning
goals of the City, including applicable City master plans." (R. 288-89.)
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Moreover, the Van Cott property plainly falls within the definition of a planned
development under the Salt Lake City Ordinance. Although Donner Crest argues that
"by no stretch of the imagination is the Van Cott Property even a valid candidate for a
PUD," Donner Crest has no direct authority for its position. Br. of Appellant p. 30.
Instead, they explain that PUDs are "on acreage of certain minimum size, usually large
enough to constitute a new community." Br. of Appellants at 30-31 (citing Saunders v.
Sharp. 793 P.2d 927,928 n.2 (Utah App. 1990)). Donner Crest attempts to mount this
argument based on citation to a footnote in one case1 and one phrase in a treatise.
But without needing to look further, the Salt Lake City Zoning Ordinance
specifically allows for a planned development to be built in the RMF-45 district on a
parcel as small as twenty thousand (20,000) square feet. S.L.C. Code § 21A.54.150,
Table E2, available at Br. of Appellants, App. - 1 , pp. 10-11. The Van Cott parcel is
approximately 1.2 acres, more than twice the minimum required area for a planned
development in the RMF-45 district.2 (R. 2). Accordingly, the Van Cott parcel is, by
statute, sufficiently large to accommodate a planned development in the district.
Finally, Donner Crest attempts to argue that, in essence, the Planning
Commission's approval of the Van Cott planned development is illegal spot zoning. Spot
zoning, as defined by the Zoning Ordinance, is "the process of singling out a small parcel

1

In fact, the footnote cited by Donner Crest gives a Vermont court's 23-year-old
definition of planned unit development. See Saunders, 793 P.2d at 929 n.2 (citing
Stevens v. Essex Junction Zoning Bd., 428 A.2d 1100,1103 (Vt. 1981)).
2
An acre is widely understood to be "[a]n area of land measuring 43,560 square feet."
Black's Law Dictionary 24 (7th Ed. 1999). As such, Van Cott's 1.2 acre parcel would
measure approximately 52,272 square feet.
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of land for a use classification materially different and inconsistent with the surrounding
area and the adopted city master plan, for the sole benefit of the owner of that property
and to the detriment of the rights of other property owners." S.L.C. Code § 21 A.62.040
(emphasis added). The Van Cott Parcel does not qualify within the Zoning Ordinance's
definition of spot zoning. As defined by Utah courts:
Spot zoning results in the creation of two types of "islands." One
type results when the zoning authority improperly limits the use
which may be made of a small parcel located in the center of an
unrestricted area. The second type of "island" results when most of
a large district is devoted to a limited or restricted use, but additional
uses are permitted in one or more spots in the district.
Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150,
1151 (Utah 1976) (citing Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino. 175 P.2d 542 (Cal. 1946)).
Presumably, Dormer Crest argues that the second type of "island" was granted to Van
Cott. In either case, the plain reality is that neither "island" was created in this case. Van
Cott's proposed project is a multi-family planned development, located in a multi-family
district. Its uses is identical to the surrounding uses. No spot zoning has occurred in this
case.
It appears that not only Van Cott and the Planning Commission, but also the
authors of the leading Utah real property law treatise, cited by Dormer Crest, understand
the planned development process to allow a planning commission to modify the
requirements of the zoning ordinance. As explained by Professors Thomas and
Backman, "[i]f a PUD proposal is accepted by the local planning commission, greater
creativity in development is possible since the housing project will not be bound by the
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requirements contained in the subdivision ordinances." David A. Thomas & James H.
Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law. § 4.04(a), p. 173 (1999).
And this is exactly what happened here. Van Cott, understanding that the unique
features of its parcel would require creativity to develop, sought approval from the
Planning Commission for a planned development conditional use permit, in accordance
with the requirements and procedures of the Zoning Ordinance. The Planning
Commission found the proposal acceptable, and approved Van Cott's application.
The Planning Commission did not merely waive the frontage requirement for the
Van Cott parcel. It made its approval of the project conditional on compliance by Van
Cott with many requirements which otherwise would not have been imposed:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

(8)

Compliance with all departmental comments and the recommendations;
Compliance with the geotechnical report as submitted by AMEC Earth &
Environmental, Inc., dated September 28, 2001, including additional preconstruction testing as recommended;
That a detailed landscape plan be submitted to the Planning Department
outlining the areas of vegetation preservation, delegating final approval to
the Planning Director, with special emphasis on creating buffering for the
neighboring projects, especially the pool area;
That final plat and development approval authority be granted to the
Planning Director;
Future Administrative consideration for condominium approval;
Consistent with the plans of the contractor, no staging be allowed in the
[Dormer] circle area;
Approval is subject to the opinion of the City Attorney that the lot is a
legally subdivided lot or, in the alternative, that before the applicant can
build, they must obtain appropriate subdivision and platting approval;3
That a snow removal plan be submitted that will not impinge upon
adjoining properties or the natural habitat or the natural stream channel, nor
require exporting snow off the property;

3

Note that the City Attorney did issue an opinion letter on August 8, 2002, stating that
the lot is legally subdivided. R. 37-38.
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(9)
(10)

(11)

That on site visitor parking stalls be increased to three stalls for this six unit
development;
Architecture and building materials must be compatible with the adjacent
neighborhood and the Planning Commission delegates responsibility to the
Planning Director to assure that the design and materials are compatible;
and
This project must be designed and built as engineered by Bill Gordon and
as described in the hearing by Chuck Culp.

(R. 290.) Clearly, the Van Cott project was subjected to the rigors of Planning
Commission review. Its planned development conditional use permit was approved, but
approval was made contingent upon compliance with all of the above-listed requirements.
The Planning Commission acted pursuant to powers delegated to it by the City
Council in approving the Van Cott planned development application, which included a
waiver of the frontage requirement. Salt Lake City delegated that power to the Planning
Commission to make that decision pursuant to the Act. The Planning Commission
lawfully acted within its properly delegated powers and granted the Van Cott planned
development application in accordance with state law and Salt Lake City ordinances.
Accordingly, the decision of the Planning Commission, the Land Use Appeals board and
the Third Judicial District Court should be upheld by this Court. Donner Crest's appeal
should be denied and the decisions below affirmed.

C.

VAN COTT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO OBTAIN A VARIANCE FROM
THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT.
Van Cott was not required to obtain a variance from the Board of Adjustment for

approval of its planned development which did not have the frontage requirement
otherwise applicable in that zoning district. As set forth above, a planned development is
part of the comprehensive zoning ordinance passed by Salt Lake City. The planned
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development is specifically provided for in the zoning ordinance. A conditional use is
not outside of the zoning ordinance - it is an express part of the zoning ordinance. The
planned development application submitted by Van Cott made application pursuant to the
specific zoning provisions allowing for a planned development. Again, and as set forth
above, the Planning Commission specifically followed and approved the application in
accordance with the state Act and the Salt Lake City zoning ordinances.
A variance, on the other hand, specifically contemplates a waiver of or
modification of an enacted zoning ordinance:
Any person or entity desiring a waiver or a modification of the
requirements of the zoning ordinances applied to a parcel of property
owned, leases, or in which he holds some other beneficial interest
may apply to the Board of Adjustment for a variance from the terms
of the zoning ordinance.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707. The specific purpose of the variance is to allow something
which is not authorized by the comprehensive zoning ordinance. Id. For example, had
Van Cott not proceeded as a planned development, Van Cott would have had to apply for
a variance in order to gain development approval. Because the planned development
ordinance specifically allowed for a waiver of the frontage requirement as part of the
planned development statutory scheme, no variance of the frontage requirement was
required. In essence, the frontage requirement was written out of the zoning
requirements for the Van Cott planned development project. As argued above, the City
Council had the authority to and did grant to the Planning Commission the authority and
powers to amend or modify the zoning ordinances for any particular planned
development, provided specific findings were made. Because the specific findings were
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made, the frontage requirement no longer applied to the Van Cott planned development
and, thus, no variance was required.
Van Cott applied for a use specifically authorized by the zoning code. Van Cott
did not seek to circumvent the requirements of the zoning ordinance and, as such, a
variance plainly was not the proper avenue to seek approval of the proposed
development. Because a planned development specifically allowed the Van Cott
development as proposed and the Planning Commission had the authority to review, hear
and decide an application for a planned development, the granting of that conditional use
by the Planning Commission was proper as a matter of law.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the District Court affirming the decision
of the Land Use Appeals Board affirming the decision of the Planning Commission
should be affirmed by this Court. The Planning Commission acted within its statutorily
granted powers in approving the Van Cott planned development application. The
Planning Commission made the requisite findings in approving the Van Cott application
for a planned development. Because Van Cott did not seek to circumvent the Zoning
Ordinances, Van Cott did not need to seek a variance. Consequently, this Court should
affirm.
Because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and
record; because the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument;
and because the arguments raised by Donner Crest do not merit significant additional
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time and resources spent by this Court and the litigants, Van Cott respectfully submits
that this case should be decided on the briefs without the need for a hearing.4
DATED this /*/ •"day of September, 2004.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Robert E. Mansfield
Stephen K. Christiansen
Attorneys for Appellees

See Utah R. App. 29(a).
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